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ABSTRACT
The killing of Cecil the lion in 2015 by a trophy hunter sparked a global debate regarding the killing of lions for ‘sport’. While many were outraged by Cecil’s killing, Cecil was just one of the millions of animals that have been used in the sports-shooting industry. Cecil’s killing brings with it the question of whether so-called ‘blood sports’ (whether these involve killing big game or smaller animals) are actually ‘sports’ at all, in the ordinary sense. As such, this paper aims to provide an analysis of blood-sport as a concept. The objective will be to examine whether blood-sports are games and to analyse to what extent, if any, blood-sports can be called ‘sports’ properly. Such an analysis will be presented through employing a generalised notion of sport and through a discussion of fair-play. Pace S. P. Morris (2014) who argues that hunting which incorporates a fair-chase code is a game and a sport, this current paper concludes that it is doubtful that blood-sport is a game, and that even if one assumes that it is a game, it cannot be classed as sport, and further that any fair-chase code undermines itself in the context of so-called ‘blood-sports’.
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(1) INTRODUCTION
A heightening of consciousness with regards to the hunting of large wild animals for sport was sparked by the killing and beheading of much loved Cecil the lion.​[1]​ People all over the world were shocked, and the killing received great attention in a range of media. Such attention made many people aware that trophy hunting is far from in the past, and in fact, such hunting is just a small part of the worldwide practice known as ‘blood-sport’. Blood-sport includes not only trophy hunting, but also the hunting of any animal classed as ‘game’, whether those animals are large, wild animals or smaller animals (such as pheasants and partridges). Indeed, it is thought that over 50 million game-birds are mass-reared every year for the sports-shooting industry,​[2]​ and that many of these birds are subject to the conditions of the factory farm (conditions which involve severe confinement, barren cages, and little freedom for the birds to protect themselves against thermal conditions.​[3]​ Investigations show that such treatment of game-birds is not unusual, despite the outlawing in the UK of the use of barren cages.​[4]​ Such considerations could prompt an ethical analysis of blood-sport, but it is not the purpose of this paper to provide such an analysis (discussions of the ethics of blood-sport can be found elsewhere​[5]​).
Rather the aim of this paper is related to the assumption that hunting and shooting animals for pleasure and leisure can be called ‘sport’.​[6]​ Indeed, for the sake of arguments concerning the ethics of blood-sport, the author has made such an assumption in previous papers for such activities are generally classed as ‘sports’. However, unlike clay shooting (see below), it is not clear that game-shooting is a sporting discipline, and this paper aims to address issues arising from an examination of the extent (if any) to which blood-sport activities can be properly called ‘sports’. That said the British Association for Shooting and Conservation maintains that game-shooting is a sport, and defines ‘sporting shooting’ as including ‘wildfowling, game, and rough shooting, [and] deer stalking’.​[7]​ But it is worth bearing in mind that the BASC aims to protect ‘shooting sports’​[8]​ and has a vested interest in emphasising that game-birding is a sport. Indeed, in the light of the controversial nature of killing animals as a pastime, or for leisure and / or pleasure, calling this activity ‘sport’ could be said to create and maintain an image of game-shooting (or shooting animals for leisure more generally) as a worthwhile or at least respectable pursuit. In examining the extent to which hunting and killing animals considered as game is a ‘sport’, this paper will shed light on whether such an image of shooting animals for leisure is an accurate portrayal of the nature of that activity. For the purposes of application and because of the sheer numbers of birds used in the sports-shooting industry, this paper focuses on a discussion of game-birding (shooting birds for sport), but its findings are applicable to all so-called ‘blood-sports’.  

(2) SPORTS, GAMES AND AN INTRODUCTION TO FAIR-PLAY ISSUES
The example of game-birding raises issues regarding the nature and norms of sport. ‘What is the nature of sport?’ is a difficult question, and there may not be one definitive answer. But this is not to say that we cannot agree about what sport is in general or agree on some of the norms of sport. A sport is probably an activity that is organised (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Organized" \o "Organized​), governed by rules, involves an element of competitive (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Competitive" \o "Competitive​) and skilful physical activity (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Physical_activity" \o "Physical activity​), and is an activity taken part in for leisure, competition or exercise. That sport may be defined as such is indicated in Jan Boxill’s claim regarding an ideal definition of sport: ‘Sport in its paradigmatic forms is a freely chosen, voluntary activity that is rule governed and requires bodily excellence, which is highlighted in competition’.​[9]​
Whilst one can recognise that this list of criteria (sport as organised, rule-governed, competitive, and involving physical skill, and as partaken for leisure, competition, or exercise) is debatable and not exhaustive, the aim here is not to provide a strict or fixed definition of sport but rather to consider whether game-birding satisfies a kind of generalised or unspecialised notion of the nature of sport; a notion which draws on the norms of sport and which can be linked to the activity of game-birding.  
Of course, from the perspective of the humans involved, shooting animals may satisfy these criteria. For example, with regards to sports having to involve competition, hunters may compete against each other for the highest number of birds shot, although this raises the issue that such a competitive aim is hardly part and parcel of the shared activity, and there is no mention of such a competitive aim within the rules laid out in the 
BASC’s codes of practice.​[10]​ If there is such a competitive element, then it would arise merely when individual players decide to introduce another element into their activity (in order to add interest, perhaps); it is certainly not a necessary or an established part of the activity. Further, there is no official count of the dead birds, nor any offical prizes for who wins, and unlike clay shooting, there are no levels of competition, and there is no official competitive aim. So, the claim that game-birding has a genuine competitive element is dubious. 
With regards to sport being a rule-governed activity, sport is commonly thought of as a gaming activity, and rules play a key role in the characterisation of games. Bernard Suits, well known for his characterisation of games, argues that an activity could be classified as a ‘game’ insofar as it may be seen as embedding certain necessary and sufficient elements:

To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by specific rules, where the means permitted  by the rules are more limited in scope that they would be in the absence of the rules, and where the sole reason for accepting such limitation is to make possible such activity.​[11]​

For Suits, games then are characterised by the following conditions: (1) engagement in activity which is directed towards a specific goal using specified rules—that goal is to be determined prior to the activity (what Suits calls a ‘pre-lusory’ goal);​[12]​ (2) the means permitted by these specific rules are more limited or inefficient​[13]​ than they would be without the rules (relatedly, Suits claims that taking part in a game is the ‘voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’);​[14]​ and (3) the person engaging in the activity accepts the rules as rules which make that activity possible. 
With regards to criterion (1), sports-shooting is directed towards a specific goal using specific rules;​[15]​ that goal, as S. P. Morris plausibly claims, most obviously being dead animals and less obviously being ‘the process of hunting’,​[16]​ the latter which I take to mean the activity leading up to the attempted kill, which would include stalking the animals. But while the activity of game-birding and blood-sports more generally are beset by certain rules, whether those rules are gaming ones is still open to question. 
In respect of (2) it is not clear that the means used in order to pursue the most obvious goal is purposely inefficient. Indeed, the Respect for Quarry code of practice emphasises that subjects participating in the activity of shooting animals for sport should ensure that they shoot within their range and never beyond it.​[17]​ That said, perhaps shooting a bird which is flying very low would be considered as too easy a shot, or participants may consider it unfair to shoot it.  But these latter considerations are not part of the sport itself (shooting a bird which is flying too low is not disallowed or termed ‘unfair’ in the codes of practice). However, Morris claims that condition (2) is satisfied via fair-chase rules, ‘where those rules prescribe less efficient means instead of more efficient means’.​[18]​  To illuminate the fair-chase code in the context of sports-shooting, Morris refers to José Ortega y Gasset’s claim that ‘As the weapon became more… effective, man imposed more… limitations on himself as the animal’s rival in order to leave it free to practice its wily defenses, in order to avoid making the prey and hunter excessively unequal’.​[19]​ 
However, the relationship between hunter and hunted may indeed be classed as ‘excessively unequal’; more will be said about this below, and further discussion will be reserved for another section (in particular, see Section 5 for a discussion of whether sport requires the consent of all participants). It is sufficient to say here that while some sports-shooting enthusiasts may attempt to implement an element of fair-play, it is not clear that such an element is a constitutive part of the supposed game (at least not in the UK), but perhaps more importantly that there is a sense in which it seems illusionary to suppose that a level ‘playing’ field can be created between a side that does not know they are part of game and which is no match against the barrel of a gun, and a side which possesses means not possessed by their ‘opponents’, and which pursues a game with the aim to kill, unbeknownst to its ‘opponents’ (an aim which is held—and capable of being held—by one side only). If the latter is true, then any fair-chase code undermines itself, irrespective of the use of inefficient means, for the very idea of a fair-chase code with regards to hunting appears incoherent. Moreover, although game-shooting may well involve an element of making the task more difficult than it needs to be in order to practise one’s shot, it is not clear that game-birding enthusiasts are required to use inefficient means to kill their target, rather than efficient ones. 
With regards to the less obvious goal of sports-shooting, that being the process of the hunt, many of the animal targets will remain concealed throughout part of the process. But in relation to game-birding, the birds are often ‘flushed’ into shooting range, either by the use of dogs or by human ‘beaters’ who scare the animals from their concealed place. Once within the target range, the animals do not have a fair chance, and may well be like sitting ducks. This is particulary relevant to hunting big game. Contrary to some perceptions (such as the perception that big game are stalked across vast tracts of land) animal welfare groups claim that lions are often captive-bred for the purpose of being ‘hunted’ for sport. Indeed, what has become known as ‘canned hunting’ involves captive-bred lions being taken to a designated, fenced-off area, in relatively open terrain before being shot by trophy hunters. The Humane Society of the United States claims that ‘[c]aptive hunts, also known as ‘canned hunts,’ are the very opposite of fair chase. Shooters at captive hunts pay to kill animals—even endangered species—trapped behind fences’.​[20]​ The term ‘canned hunting’ certainly points to the idea that the animals are easy targets. As Patrick Barkham writes, ‘The easy slaughter of animals in fenced areas is called ‘canned hunting’, perhaps because it’s rather like shooting fish in a barrel’.​[21]​ Overall, although some hunters may well make the process of hunting more inefficient than it could be, it is far from clear that such inefficiency is a necessary part of shooting for sport; rather, such inefficiency may well be something that the individual hunters themselves value, rather than something that is typical of shooting-sports generally.
It is noteworthy that making the means to the kill less efficient than it could be means that (even when there are some participants who have an excellent shot) there are bound to be some participants who merely injure the target animals, resulting in unnecessary suffering for those animals. This casts further doubt on the claim that the ‘game’ is a fair one: animals lose not only when they face skilled shooters (they lose their lives, and quickly), but they also lose when faced with less skilled ones (for example, by being injured, or dying a slow or painful death). As such, even if one assumes that the means used are less efficient that they could be, the use of inefficient means in sport-shooting (even in what Morris calls ‘fair-chase hunting’, according to which ‘the idea is to maintain some semblance of balance in the… relationship between hunters and the hunted’)​[22]​ does not appear to be conducive to creating a level playing field for all the ‘players’, animals included, and thus fair-play does not so far appear compatible with the ‘game’.
It is also open to doubt as to whether the activity of sports-shooting fulfils criterion (3), which states that the person engaging in the activity accepts the rules as rules which make that activity possible. The person engaging in the activity of game-birding may well accept the rules of that activity as rules which make that activity possible, but only in the sense that following such rules is part of the health and safety aspect of the game, rather that constitutive of the game itself. Indeed, the codes of sports-shooting in the UK (as laid out in the Code of Good Shooting Practice and the other codes devised by the BASC) look nothing like rules of a game. The ‘Five Golden Rules’ relate primarily to the safe conduct of participants and to conservation,​[23]​ not to what one might call ‘playing the game’. That said, Morris argues that shooting for sport does fulfil condition (3) insofar as that activity can be classed as ‘fair-chase hunting’; ‘the strongest indication that the hunt has been made into a game is the adoption of a fair-chase ethic. In fact, the very purpose of adopting a fair-chase ethic is to make a game of the hunt’.​[24]​ However, as said above, there is a contention regarding whether fair-play can or does constitute an element of the activity of shooting animals for sport; a contention to which the author will return. 
Suffice it to say here that even if one accepts for argument’s sake that game-birding can indeed be classed as a game, it does not follow that it is a sport, for while it is generally accepted that all sports are games, not all games are sports. Besides, insofar as taking part in a game is, in Suits’s words, the ‘voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’​[25]​ then it remains even more unlikely that blood-sports can be classed as games because the ‘players’ on one side of the game are certainly not voluntary participants, as will be discussed in what follows (Sections 4 and 5, below)

(3) SPORT AND BLOODSPORTS
Suits provides direction on whether a game can be classed as a sport by presenting necessary and sufficient conditions the fulfillment of which make a game a sport.​[26]​ For the sake of brevity, the author refers to the work of Mike McNamee who concisely outlines these conditions as follows: ‘(1) That the game be a game of skill; (2) That the skill be physical; (3) That the game have a wide following; (4) That the following achieve a wide level of stability’.​[27]​ The first two conditions form part of the definition of sport mentioned at the beginning of this paper; a definition which admittedly is not precise, but which nevertheless outlines the general features of sport. The second two conditions appear to be ones which are quite exclusive in the sense that were they accepted as necessary then some lesser known activities currently classed as sports would no longer be classed as such. Consider, for example, Aerial skiiing, a free-style skiing activity which is now an Olympic sport, but which has relatively few followers. Or one could consider the example given by McNamee himself: bog-snorkelling. Whilst noting that, as McNamee claims,​[28]​ conditions (3) and (4) are quite vague, many would be quick to claim that bog-snorkelling falls short in terms of fulfilling these conditions due to its lesser popularity (and perhaps because it is a relatively new activity) compared with many other sports. On the other hand, bog snorkellers could argue otherwise:

One can imagine bog snorkelling enthusiasts arguing that the rules of the activity have been laid down for a given number of years. Its World Championships include over one hundred participants… Its spectators attend in significant numbers… All these simple criticisms seem legitimate objections to the idea of a once-and-for-all crystallising of the essence of sport in any way, not merely the manner in which Suits has.​[29]​ 

But even if one goes some way with Suits and accepts for argument’s sake that his proposed conditions for what constitute a game are at least necessary ones (notwithstanding arguments claiming that they constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions)​[30]​ and that game-birding fulfils these necessary conditions, and even if one further accepts some of Suit’s proposals regarding the conditions necessary for games to count as sports, it is far from clear that these conditions alone sufficiently express that which constitutes a sporting activity. Nor do they capture one of the central norms of sports, that which is related to the idea of a sporting chance (discussion of which will be reserved for following section). 
Overall, while conditions (1) and (2) are generally accepted as necessary conditions for sport, it is reasonable to reject (3) and (4) as necessary. Besides, as indicated in the above quotation, McNamee argues that the concept of sport is not fixed, but open to revision over time and in the light of new circumstances.​[31]​ That said, he plausibly also recognises that ‘there must be a limit to the range of revisions possible for the social activity to retain its referent: sport’.​[32]​ Certainly, in order for the term ‘sport’ to have a referent, there must be some resemblances between those activities we commonly class as sport; resemblances which allow us to recognise those activities as sporting ones. Such resemblances point to the norms of sport, one of which is fair-play (to which the author will now turn).

(4) BLOODSPORTS AND FAIR-PLAY
Returning to the aforementioned generalised notion of sport (sport as an activity that is organised (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Organized" \o "Organized​), rule-governed, involves an element of competition and physical skill (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Physical_activity" \o "Physical activity​), and is an activity taken part in for leisure, competition or exercise), it has been stated that it is arguable whether there is any competition involved in game-shooting, and that the rules of game-shooting look nothing like rules of a game but more like health and safety rules and rules related to conservation (particularly countryside mangagement). Further, there are animals involved in this activity and, unlike a ball or hockey stick, the animals are sentient beings that have no doubt been forced into the ‘game’. As such, it could be questioned as to whether so-called ‘blood sports’ are actually ‘sports’ at all, in the ordinary sense, since the animals involved could not be said to be involved in an activity for leisure, competition or exercise. Of course, to say this is, in some sense, to speak from the position of the animals reared and killed for ‘sport’. But thinking about their position is important, for one should also think about the principles and norms that apply in sports, because these often play a role in our being able to say what makes certain activities sporting ones. 
Indeed, we usually think it is important in sport to take into consideration the interests of those involved. This seems of fundamental importance to a conception of sport, otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish between, say, competitive murderous activities pursued for leisure or exercise and competitive non-murderous activities pursued for the same reasons. In examining what makes an activity a sporting or an unsporting activity then one probably needs to examine the values or norms that are characteristic of sports activities. This concern is a normative one, rather than a descriptive one. Indeed, it seems that answers to questions about the nature of sport and sporting (or unsporting) activities will tend to contain not just a descriptive element but an evaluative element too. So in trying to capture what makes an activity sporting (or unsporting), one would usually have to refer to certain norms or values, not just give a descriptive account of the physical and mental skills of the participants in that activity. Now, although it is far from clear that game-shooting fulfils descriptive criteria for what makes an activity a sport, even if one assumes that it does, can this activity be seen as one in which those involved exercise certain values or follow certain norms that are commonly thought to be characteristic of sporting (rather than unsporting) activities?
One norm that is generally agreed to be fundamental to sport is that of fair-play. Without fair-play, activities that we call ‘sports’ may include those according to which it would be justifiable to play to win at all costs to the other participants. Indeed, Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider argue that ‘the notion of fair play has its grounding in the very logic of sport itself’.​[33]​ That said there are competing notions of fair-play: fair-play as linked to certain virtuous behaviour; fair-play as ‘fair contest’; and fair-play as respect for the rules of the game and implicitly contractually agreeing to those rules, so that, for example, breaking the rules is unfair since one has already agreed to compete in a way which adheres to those rules and not breaking those rules is part of what it means to participate in the game.​[34]​ Relatedly, Jan Boxill claims that ‘In playing the game one agrees to abide by the rules, recognizing both their importance and their essential fairness’.​[35]​ Accepting that there may be a lack of consensus with respect to what constitutes fair-play in sport, it certainly seems to mean more than merely following the rules of the game. Fair-play is often linked with behaviours, characteristics or virtues that should be promoted, or ways in which the game should be played. We could also think of fair-play in sport as involving something like a level playing field, where no person has an unfair advantage or where each person has a like ability to compete. This notion of fair-play seems to be much like the idea of a sporting chance. 
	Again, I am not here attempting to outline a strict definition of fair-play, but to consider general features of the norm; two of which appear to play a role in specific definitions. These are: (1) the idea of a sporting chance (according to which each player has a reasonable chance of winning, and the means used to succeed are equally balanced between each player, so that, for example, were the author to play Javelin with the reader, both the author and reader would have a Javelin (means) and both the author and the reader would have a fair chance of winning or succeeding); and (2) the idea of players entering either an implicit or explicit agreement regarding the rules of the game or at least voluntarily entering into the game (the latter which is meant to imply at least an implicit agreement to the rules). Both these ideas appear to be central to more specific definitions of fair-play in sport. If blood-sport activities fail to incorporate these ideas into practice, then it is reasonable to say that the norm of fair-play, as central to sporting activities, appears missing from the practice of blood-sport. And if so then ‘blood-sport’ is not a sporting practice. The author now turns to a discussion of fair-play in terms of a sporting chance and voluntary agreement to the game (in the context of blood-sports). 

(5) VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT AND A SPORTING-CHANCE 
For fair-play in sport it seems reasonable to suppose that those involved in a sporting activity must be willing or voluntary participants (and thus agree to the rules), and this requires (at the very least) that they know that they are in the game. In relation to blood-sport, John Alan Cohan states
[T]he activity pits a human… against a wild animal that is incapable of ‘consenting’ to the ‘game,’ rather than a human being against another human being. Even if there were ‘rules’ that constitute hunting, animals do not have the capability of comprehending the rules, and hence they cannot be said to be ‘participants’ in any real sense. The hunted animal does not ‘understand’ or ‘agree’ to any sort of participation in the enterprise, or to make an effort to ‘win’ in the engagement. Hunted animals do not ‘choose’ to engage in the activity; they are not voluntary participants.​[36]​

In respect of game-shooting, the birds certainly do not willingly or even voluntarily partake in the pastime. So, there is no sense in which they could be said to be entering into a contract regarding the rules of the game. Only the hunter (only one side) knows that he / she is in the game (if it can even be classed as such). 
Of course, participants may say that amongst the human players there is fair-play in the sense of agreeing to and abiding by the rules. Each human player has implicitly or explicitly made such an agreement. But, as said in a previous section, one can reasonably doubt whether these rules are gaming ones, as well as doubt whether they aim to foster an element of fair-play. And if the rules are not gaming ones, then it is not surprising that they do not foster fair-play, for the very notion of fair-play appears to be at least intimately tied to the notion of playing a game. Further, if the activity of sports-shooting is not a game, then there is no sense in which one could say it is a sport. It is worth noting again here that there appears to be little or at least no formal competition involved in game-shooting, and this applies to sport-shooting more generally. In the light of these considerations, the idea that game-shooting is not a sport is certainly plausible. 
Cohan lends further support to the claim that so-called sports-shooting does not involve competition, arguing the following:

If hunting is a sport, it would have to be a competitive sport, for the activity involves a competitive engagement of some kind, with two or more ‘players’—the hunter and the hunted subject. There is a particular structure to agonistic sports. Such sports are literally constituted by rules that are established by the inventors of the game, and are agreed upon by players who voluntarily play the game… The players compete against each other according to these rules until the winner is declared and the game ends. The players are supposed to be competitively matched so as to allow for a fair game. There are rules against attacking the bodily integrity of the other players… [T]hese elements are absent in the activity of hunting.​[37]​ 

Cohan here draws on the idea of a sporting chance but, in relation to such an idea, blood-sport enthusiasts might claim that there are unwritten rules of the game that aim to foster an element of fair-play at least between the hunters so that each hunter is on a level playing field. Some may say that this is satisfactory for fair-play, since the birds are not players; the players are the human participants. However, even if we suppose that there are such unwritten rules and that the humans only are the real players, this is not a reason for supposing that sporting ethics should only apply to the humans involved, not to the birds, since, unlike inanimate objects in a game, birds are fatally harmed through hunting. Indeed, their deaths are actively sought. They certainly appear to get the raw end of the deal in the game, whether or not the hunters consider the birds to be players. 
However, contrary to what some game-shooting enthusiasts may argue, surely the game, if it is one, is (as Cohan argues) between the hunted and hunter? (This would have to be true for enthusiasts who claim to endorse a fair-chase code, implying as it does fairness between those chasing and those being chased). In other words, the game is between the armed and unarmed. And this is deeply problematic if we are concerned about promoting fairness, for the birds are not really given anything like a sporting chance but instead are distinctly disadvantaged. 
That which Morris refers to as ‘fair-chase ethics’ deserves discussion again here, for his presentation of such an ethic is resonant of the notion of a sporting chance: 

[T]he idea is to maintain some semblance of balance in the predator-prey relationship between hunters and the hunted. Hunters have at their disposal a vast array of machinery capable of generating tremendous inequalities in this regard. With all the best equipment at work the predator-prey balance can be significantly compromised in favor of the former… but the expressed intent of fair-chase is to prevent this inequality from becoming excessive.​[38]​

For Morris, the method by which such imbalances in equality can be prevented involves ‘the deliberate rejection of more efficient means in favor of less efficient’​[39]​ (and, as we have seen, such a rejection serves to satisfy one of Suit’s conditions for a game). But, while individual sports-shooting enthusiasts may well attempt to use less efficient means to achieve their goal, this hardly can be said to create anything close to a balance between the hunter and the hunted, even when one assumes that the hunted are wild animals (and thereby well habituated to their territory), stalked over a vast tract of land, much less animals which are captive-bred for the purpose of shooting-sports and are more often than not confined to a certain area for the propose of being shot (preventing them from having an opportunity to properly escape) and are often lured or ‘flushed’ into the open.  Furthermore, no animal is even capable of using the same means as the human participants by taking up arms; no animal is even aware of the apparent game (let alone aware of the supposed rules of the ‘game’); and no animal has a sporting chance against the bullet of a gun (if they do survive they are either shot at close range soon afterwards, or they may manage to crawl away, in which case they probably face a lingering death). 
The relationship is drastically unequal, and this is true whether or not the animals used for sports are wild or captive-bred and is so even assuming that the hunter employs inefficient means. Further, as said in a previous section, it is reasonable to assume that the use of such means could well result in animals being merely maimed, thereby causing more suffering than necessary, but if hunting were to somehow incorporate something called a ‘fair-chase ethic’ then surely it would require that animals be killed quickly and painlessly, and one of the best ways to ensure this would be to promote efficient rather than inefficient means. Besides, in the UK at least, the codes of practice regarding sports-shooting are at least strongly suggestive of efficiency, rather than inefficiency, with regards to shooting animals. Moreover, it is not insignificant that it makes no sense to say that the animal could ‘win’ the ‘game’. And if they cannot win, it makes little sense to say that they have a sporting chance. 
In respect of commercial game-shooting, the playing field is clearly in favour of the hunter. This is particularly true with regards to intensively reared game-birds, but also applies to game-birds reared by less intensive methods. Between the period of their release and the hunt, such birds will have to adapt quickly to their environment. But many will take time to respond to their surroundings and to build the strength to have any real chance of fleeing from the hunter. By the time of the hunt, it is likely that such birds will be more vulnerable than wild game-birds. (Most birds which are hunted for the purpose of sport have been commercially reared for that very purpose, so the concerns just outlined relate to the majority of birds used for sport.) That said the Game Farmers’ Association states that ‘[g]ood game farming ensures that these birds… are strong, fit and ready for the natural environment in which they will live’,​[40]​ and DEFRA lays out welfare requirements regarding game-birds.​[41]​ Yet it is far from clear that such requirements are sufficiently enforced (as suggested in the introduction), and for this reason it is not obvious that those involved in the rearing and releasing of game-birds are rearing birds that will be well adapted for release into the countryside or that will have anything like a sporting chance.

(6) CONCLUSIONS
This brings the author back to whether game-shooting is a sport, for not only is it questionable whether there is a game going on, not least because only the hunters know they are in a game, but the activity fails to embody (and appears incapable of coherently embodying) the norm of fair-play (as bound to the notions of a sporting chance and voluntary agreement to the game) that is of fundamental importance to sport. Moreover, in relation to Suits’s claim that taking part in a game is the ‘voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’, it is clear that, for the hunted, their part in the ‘game’ is not such an attempt.
But even if one assumes that blood-sport is a game and that it fulfils Suit’s conditions for a game, it does not follow that it is a sport. It is reasonable to accept two of Suit’s conditions for sport as necessary ones, those being that it is a game of skill and that the skill is physical, and one might also be able to accept that blood-sport fulfils these conditions, but only in relation to one side of the ‘game’ (the other side has no awareness that they are in a game, let alone an awareness of the rules, so it makes no sense to say that they could become ‘skilled at the game’). Human participants may claim here that the rules apply to them alone. But the game, if there is one, is surely between the hunter and hunted, and if so then the conditions need to be applicable to the hunted too. In any case, the aforementioned conditions fail to capture what makes an activity a sporting one, and so do not appear sufficient for sport.
If we return to the definition of sport mentioned at the beginning of this paper (sport as organised (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Organized" \o "Organized​), rule-governed, involving an element of competitive (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Competitive" \o "Competitive​) and skilful physical activity (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Physical_activity" \o "Physical activity​), and as an activity taken part in for leisure, competition or exercise), then calling game-birding ‘sport’ becomes even more problematic, for if there is a game going on, then it is between the humans and the animals, yet the animals involved do not willingly partake in the pastime and nor could they be said to be involved in an activity for leisure, competition or exercise. And because one side of the game is unaware that they are ‘players’, there cannot be genuine competition between the sides, still less fair competition. But even with regards to the human players only, the ‘sport’ still lacks any real competitive element. 
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